It is true that at the ports run by the Dubai company, Customs officers >>> would continue to do any inspection of cargo containers and the Coast >>> Guard would remain "in charge" of port security. But, again, very few >>> cargo inspections are conducted. And the Coast Guard merely sets >>> standards that ports are to follow and reviews their security plans. >>> Meeting those standards each day is the job of the port operators: they >>> are responsible for hiring security officers, guarding the cargo and >>> overseeing its unloading.>>>

You probably think there is no hunger in America and that everyone who>>> needs medical attention gets the kind of care they need.>>

I love the way NY Times tries to spin this. Such BS. Shows how screwed >>> up NY Times is!!>>>

Duh. The piece was not written by the NY Times, but by the Bush >>> Administration's former inspector general for Homeland Security. I >>> suspect the author, who is an acknowledged expect on the subject, knows >>> just a tad more about port security than you do, eh?>>>

You probably think there is no hunger in America and that everyone who >>> needs medical attention gets the kind of care they need.>>

"Harry Krause" <harry.krause@gmail­.com> wrote in message >>> news:soednQwYEMv3bG­DeRVn-uw@comcast.com­...>>>> Dan J.S. wrote:>>>>>

I actually think in this case I may have been wrong about my stance on >>> the port thing. The more I look into it, the worse it looks. You are >>> right, I am wrong.>>>

"Dan J.S." <me@hyperx.com> wrote in message >>> news:11vrufpoqsmr3d­@news.supernews.com.­..>>>>

At the rate you're going, you may soon be able to pass the NY >>> State-mandated reading comprehension test that my son took when he was >>> 12. Congratulations!>>>­

"Doug Kanter" <ancientangler@hotm­ail.com> wrote in message >>> news:1WmLf.976$kg.8­71@news02.roc.ny...>­>>>

You know, English was not my first language.>>>

http://www.fana.com­/index.asp?PID=18&ci­d=48&sid=558#link558­>>>

But it is now.>>>

Don't bother Dan with facts. It makes his head hurt.>>>

That would assume he cares. For most Bush sycophants, the world begins>>> and ends with themselves.>>>

begin quoted text >>>>>>

Excerpt from 9/11 Commission testimony of CIA DIRECTOR GEORGE TENET,>>> Eighth Public Hearing, Wednesday, March 24, 2004, Hart Senate Office>>> Building, Washington, DC>>> CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN>>>

MR. FIELDING: Well, yesterday we talked about the three events in '98>>> and '99 where there were occasions that it looked like there might be>>> an opportunity, which then in each instance was deemed not to be>>> operational. And the one that I find the most intriguing and the one>>> that's been labeled as perhaps the lost opportunity more than any was>>> the February '99 hunting camp, I guess it's been described, and the>>> desert camp. And yesterday in the staff statement that was read, we>>> were told about that and we were told that the intelligence seemed>>> pretty strong, and that the preparations were made and then the strike>>> was called off, and -- although the lead CIA agent in the field felt>>> that it was very reliable intelligence. I guess, was there anything>>> unique about the intelligence or the circumstances that necessitated>>> that decision, and who made that decision?>>>

MR. TENET: I don't have a recollection of the uniqueness of the>>> intelligence in question at the time. I'm going to go back and provide>>> that for you. In fact, I'd like to go back and try and package up all>>> the data at my disposal when we were thinking about these issues.>>>

I believe this was a collective decision. I also believe this target>>> went away because the camp was ultimately dismantled. So in reading>>> through your staff inquiry, your staff notes on this, I can't recall>>> who made the call, but I know we were all in the same place about it,>>> Mr. Fielding.>>>

MR. FIELDING: Yeah. Well, I would appreciate that on behalf of the>>> Commission if you could do that because it seemed that this -- when the>>> intelligence was so good, and that by the time the camp was dismantled>>> days and days had passed.>>>

So I would appreciate -->>>

MR. TENET: There's also a question, I believe, as to whether bin Ladin>>> was inside or outside the camp -->>>

MR. FIELDING: Of course.>>>

MR. TENET: -- it was a complicating issue in this whole thing -- and>>> whether he was there or not. So there's a second complicating factor>>> here.>>>

The third complicating factor here is, you might have wiped out half>>> the royal family in the UAE in the process, which I'm sure entered into>>> everybody's calculation in all this.>>>

But in any event, I would like -- I will try and reconstruct the data>>> as best I can, in terms of what I had in my possession at the time.>>>

MR. FIELDING: I would appreciate it. Thank you. And thank you for your>>> testimony.>>>

I see that little red light is on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.>>>

Click Here for the full transcription:>>> http://www.9-11comm­ission.gov/archive/h­earing8/9-11Commissi­on_Hearing_2004-03-2­4.htm>>>

Excerpt from 9/11 Commission Staff Statement #6, Eighth Public Hearing,>>> Tuesday, March 23, 2004, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC>>> CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN:>>>

The Desert Camp, February 1999. During the winter of 1998-99,>>> intelligence reported that Bin Ladin frequently visited a camp in the>>> desert, adjacent to a larger hunting camp in Helmand Province of>>> Afghanistan, used by visitors from a Gulf state. Public sources have>>> stated that these visitors were from the United Arab Emirates. At the>>> beginning of February, Bin Ladin was reportedly located there, and>>> apparently remained for more than a week. This was not in an urban>>> area, so the risk of collateral damage was minimal. Intelligence>>> provided a detailed description of the camps. National technical>>> intelligence confirmed the description of the larger camp, and showed>>> the nearby presence of an official aircraft of the UAE. The CIA>>> received reports that Bin Ladin regularly went from his adjacent camp>>> to the larger camp where he visited with Emiratis. The location of this>>> larger camp was confirmed by February 9, but the location of Bin>>> Ladin's quarters could not be pinned down so precisely.>>>

Preparations were made for a possible strike, against the larger camp,>>> perhaps to target Bin Ladin during one of his visits. No strike was>>> launched.>>>

According to CIA officials, policymakers were concerned about the>>> danger that a strike might kill an Emirati prince or other senior>>> officials who might be with Bin Ladin or close by. The lead CIA>>> official in the field felt the intelligence reporting in this case was>>> very reliable. The UBL unit chief at the time agrees. The field>>> official believes today that this was a lost opportunity to kill Bin>>> Ladin before 9/11.>>>

Clarke told us the strike was called off because the intelligence was>>> dubious, and it seemed to him as if the CIA was presenting an option to>>> attack America's best counterterrorism ally in the Gulf. Documentary>>> evidence at the time shows that on February 10th Clarke detailed to>>> Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick the intelligence>>> placing UBL in the camp, informed him that DOD might be in a position>>> to fire the next morning, and added that General Shelton was looking at>>> other options that might be ready the following week. Clarke had just>>> returned from a visit to the UAE, working on counterterrorism>>>­ cooperation and following up on a May 1998 UAE agreement to buy F-16>>> aircraft from the United States.>>>

On February 10th, Clarke reported that a top UAE official had>>> vehemently denied that high-level UAE officials were in Afghanistan.>>> Evidence subsequently confirmed that high-level UAE officials had been>>> there.>>>

By February 12th, Bin Ladin had apparently moved on and the immediate>>> strike plans became moot.>>>

In March, the entire camp complex was hurriedly disassembled. We are>>> still examining several aspects of this episode.>>>

My head is hurting, let me process these facts. Thanks!>>>

The US Coast Guard is responsible for approving the procedures for port>>>security, but the operator hires the personnel to do the job and manages>>>them on the job.>>