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Re: OT: Still think the UAE should get the contract?
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GYXU > Boats > Re: OT: Still think the UAE should get the contract? 25 February 2006 00:58:55

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Re: OT: Still think the UAE should get the contract?

Harry Krause 25 February 2006 00:58:55
 obcboatSPLINTER@hotm­ail.com wrote:> No, eh?>
begin quoted text >>>>
Excerpt from 9/11 Commission testimony of CIA DIRECTOR GEORGE TENET,> Eighth Public Hearing, Wednesday, March 24, 2004, Hart Senate Office> Building, Washington, DC> CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN>
MR. FIELDING: Well, yesterday we talked about the three events in '98> and '99 where there were occasions that it looked like there might be> an opportunity, which then in each instance was deemed not to be> operational. And the one that I find the most intriguing and the one> that's been labeled as perhaps the lost opportunity more than any was> the February '99 hunting camp, I guess it's been described, and the> desert camp. And yesterday in the staff statement that was read, we> were told about that and we were told that the intelligence seemed> pretty strong, and that the preparations were made and then the strike> was called off, and -- although the lead CIA agent in the field felt> that it was very reliable intelligence. I guess, was there anything> unique about the intelligence or the circumstances that necessitated> that decision, and who made that decision?>
MR. TENET: I don't have a recollection of the uniqueness of the> intelligence in question at the time. I'm going to go back and provide> that for you. In fact, I'd like to go back and try and package up all> the data at my disposal when we were thinking about these issues.>
I believe this was a collective decision. I also believe this target> went away because the camp was ultimately dismantled. So in reading> through your staff inquiry, your staff notes on this, I can't recall> who made the call, but I know we were all in the same place about it,> Mr. Fielding.>
MR. FIELDING: Yeah. Well, I would appreciate that on behalf of the> Commission if you could do that because it seemed that this -- when the> intelligence was so good, and that by the time the camp was dismantled> days and days had passed.>
So I would appreciate -->
MR. TENET: There's also a question, I believe, as to whether bin Ladin> was inside or outside the camp -->
MR. FIELDING: Of course.>
MR. TENET: -- it was a complicating issue in this whole thing -- and> whether he was there or not. So there's a second complicating factor> here.>
The third complicating factor here is, you might have wiped out half> the royal family in the UAE in the process, which I'm sure entered into> everybody's calculation in all this.>
But in any event, I would like -- I will try and reconstruct the data> as best I can, in terms of what I had in my possession at the time.>
MR. FIELDING: I would appreciate it. Thank you. And thank you for your> testimony.>
I see that little red light is on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.>
Excerpt from 9/11 Commission Staff Statement #6, Eighth Public Hearing,> Tuesday, March 23, 2004, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC> CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN:>
The Desert Camp, February 1999. During the winter of 1998-99,> intelligence reported that Bin Ladin frequently visited a camp in the> desert, adjacent to a larger hunting camp in Helmand Province of> Afghanistan, used by visitors from a Gulf state. Public sources have> stated that these visitors were from the United Arab Emirates. At the> beginning of February, Bin Ladin was reportedly located there, and> apparently remained for more than a week. This was not in an urban> area, so the risk of collateral damage was minimal. Intelligence> provided a detailed description of the camps. National technical> intelligence confirmed the description of the larger camp, and showed> the nearby presence of an official aircraft of the UAE. The CIA> received reports that Bin Ladin regularly went from his adjacent camp> to the larger camp where he visited with Emiratis. The location of this> larger camp was confirmed by February 9, but the location of Bin> Ladin's quarters could not be pinned down so precisely.>
Preparations were made for a possible strike, against the larger camp,> perhaps to target Bin Ladin during one of his visits. No strike was> launched.>
According to CIA officials, policymakers were concerned about the> danger that a strike might kill an Emirati prince or other senior> officials who might be with Bin Ladin or close by. The lead CIA> official in the field felt the intelligence reporting in this case was> very reliable. The UBL unit chief at the time agrees. The field> official believes today that this was a lost opportunity to kill Bin> Ladin before 9/11.>
Clarke told us the strike was called off because the intelligence was> dubious, and it seemed to him as if the CIA was presenting an option to> attack America's best counterterrorism ally in the Gulf. Documentary> evidence at the time shows that on February 10th Clarke detailed to> Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick the intelligence> placing UBL in the camp, informed him that DOD might be in a position> to fire the next morning, and added that General Shelton was looking at> other options that might be ready the following week. Clarke had just> returned from a visit to the UAE, working on counterterrorism> cooperation and following up on a May 1998 UAE agreement to buy F-16> aircraft from the United States.>
On February 10th, Clarke reported that a top UAE official had> vehemently denied that high-level UAE officials were in Afghanistan.> Evidence subsequently confirmed that high-level UAE officials had been> there.>
By February 12th, Bin Ladin had apparently moved on and the immediate> strike plans became moot.>
In March, the entire camp complex was hurriedly disassembled. We are> still examining several aspects of this episode.>


Even more directly, someone here the other day was claiming that
operational authority over the ports had nothing to do with their security.

Well, that is wrong.

The US Coast Guard is responsible for approving the procedures for port
security, but the operator hires the personnel to do the job and manages
them on the job.
Add comment
JimH 23 February 2006 19:42:08 permanent link ]
 
"Harry Krause" <harry.krause@gmail­.com> wrote in message
news:9M2dnfnnDd2aeG­DeRVn-rQ@comcast.com­...> obcboatSPLINTER@hot­mail.com wrote:>> No, eh?>>
begin quoted text >>>>>
Excerpt from 9/11 Commission testimony of CIA DIRECTOR GEORGE TENET,>> Eighth Public Hearing, Wednesday, March 24, 2004, Hart Senate Office>> Building, Washington, DC>> CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN>>
MR. FIELDING: Well, yesterday we talked about the three events in '98>> and '99 where there were occasions that it looked like there might be>> an opportunity, which then in each instance was deemed not to be>> operational. And the one that I find the most intriguing and the one>> that's been labeled as perhaps the lost opportunity more than any was>> the February '99 hunting camp, I guess it's been described, and the>> desert camp. And yesterday in the staff statement that was read, we>> were told about that and we were told that the intelligence seemed>> pretty strong, and that the preparations were made and then the strike>> was called off, and -- although the lead CIA agent in the field felt>> that it was very reliable intelligence. I guess, was there anything>> unique about the intelligence or the circumstances that necessitated>> that decision, and who made that decision?>>
MR. TENET: I don't have a recollection of the uniqueness of the>> intelligence in question at the time. I'm going to go back and provide>> that for you. In fact, I'd like to go back and try and package up all>> the data at my disposal when we were thinking about these issues.>>
I believe this was a collective decision. I also believe this target>> went away because the camp was ultimately dismantled. So in reading>> through your staff inquiry, your staff notes on this, I can't recall>> who made the call, but I know we were all in the same place about it,>> Mr. Fielding.>>
MR. FIELDING: Yeah. Well, I would appreciate that on behalf of the>> Commission if you could do that because it seemed that this -- when the>> intelligence was so good, and that by the time the camp was dismantled>> days and days had passed.>>
So I would appreciate -->>
MR. TENET: There's also a question, I believe, as to whether bin Ladin>> was inside or outside the camp -->>
MR. FIELDING: Of course.>>
MR. TENET: -- it was a complicating issue in this whole thing -- and>> whether he was there or not. So there's a second complicating factor>> here.>>
The third complicating factor here is, you might have wiped out half>> the royal family in the UAE in the process, which I'm sure entered into>> everybody's calculation in all this.>>
But in any event, I would like -- I will try and reconstruct the data>> as best I can, in terms of what I had in my possession at the time.>>
MR. FIELDING: I would appreciate it. Thank you. And thank you for your>> testimony.>>
I see that little red light is on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.>>
Excerpt from 9/11 Commission Staff Statement #6, Eighth Public Hearing,>> Tuesday, March 23, 2004, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC>> CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN:>>
The Desert Camp, February 1999. During the winter of 1998-99,>> intelligence reported that Bin Ladin frequently visited a camp in the>> desert, adjacent to a larger hunting camp in Helmand Province of>> Afghanistan, used by visitors from a Gulf state. Public sources have>> stated that these visitors were from the United Arab Emirates. At the>> beginning of February, Bin Ladin was reportedly located there, and>> apparently remained for more than a week. This was not in an urban>> area, so the risk of collateral damage was minimal. Intelligence>> provided a detailed description of the camps. National technical>> intelligence confirmed the description of the larger camp, and showed>> the nearby presence of an official aircraft of the UAE. The CIA>> received reports that Bin Ladin regularly went from his adjacent camp>> to the larger camp where he visited with Emiratis. The location of this>> larger camp was confirmed by February 9, but the location of Bin>> Ladin's quarters could not be pinned down so precisely.>>
Preparations were made for a possible strike, against the larger camp,>> perhaps to target Bin Ladin during one of his visits. No strike was>> launched.>>
According to CIA officials, policymakers were concerned about the>> danger that a strike might kill an Emirati prince or other senior>> officials who might be with Bin Ladin or close by. The lead CIA>> official in the field felt the intelligence reporting in this case was>> very reliable. The UBL unit chief at the time agrees. The field>> official believes today that this was a lost opportunity to kill Bin>> Ladin before 9/11.>>
Clarke told us the strike was called off because the intelligence was>> dubious, and it seemed to him as if the CIA was presenting an option to>> attack America's best counterterrorism ally in the Gulf. Documentary>> evidence at the time shows that on February 10th Clarke detailed to>> Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick the intelligence>> placing UBL in the camp, informed him that DOD might be in a position>> to fire the next morning, and added that General Shelton was looking at>> other options that might be ready the following week. Clarke had just>> returned from a visit to the UAE, working on counterterrorism>> cooperation and following up on a May 1998 UAE agreement to buy F-16>> aircraft from the United States.>>
On February 10th, Clarke reported that a top UAE official had>> vehemently denied that high-level UAE officials were in Afghanistan.>> Evidence subsequently confirmed that high-level UAE officials had been>> there.>>
By February 12th, Bin Ladin had apparently moved on and the immediate>> strike plans became moot.>>
In March, the entire camp complex was hurriedly disassembled. We are>> still examining several aspects of this episode.>>
Even more directly, someone here the other day was claiming that > operational authority over the ports had nothing to do with their > security.>
Well, that is wrong.>
The US Coast Guard is responsible for approving the procedures for port > security, but the operator hires the personnel to do the job and manages > them on the job.


I have to call you on that one Harry. Could you provide proof of your
statement?


Add comment
Dan J.S. 23 February 2006 20:21:53 permanent link ]
 

It is true that at the ports run by the Dubai company, Customs officers > would continue to do any inspection of cargo containers and the Coast > Guard would remain "in charge" of port security. But, again, very few > cargo inspections are conducted. And the Coast Guard merely sets standards > that ports are to follow and reviews their security plans. Meeting those > standards each day is the job of the port operators: they are responsible > for hiring security officers, guarding the cargo and overseeing its > unloading.>

I love the way NY Times tries to spin this. Such BS. Shows how screwed up NY
Times is!!



Add comment
Dan J.S. 23 February 2006 21:03:33 permanent link ]
 
<Mark_Reichert@hotm­ail.com> wrote in message
news:1140716551.887­388.266520@g14g2000c­wa.googlegroups.com.­..> Harry Krause wrote:>> Dan J.S. wrote:>> Duh. The piece was not written by the NY Times, but by the Bush>> Administration's former inspector general for Homeland Security. I>> suspect the author, who is an acknowledged expect on the subject, knows>> just a tad more about port security than you do, eh?>
Don't bother Dan with facts. It makes his head hurt.>
You probably think there is no hunger in America and that everyone who>> needs medical attention gets the kind of care they need.>
That would assume he cares. For most Bush sycophants, the world begins> and ends with themselves.>

My head is hurting, let me process these facts. Thanks!


Add comment
Dan J.S. 23 February 2006 21:07:52 permanent link ]
 
"Harry Krause" <harry.krause@gmail­.com> wrote in message
news:soednQwYEMv3bG­DeRVn-uw@comcast.com­...> Dan J.S. wrote:>>
It is true that at the ports run by the Dubai company, Customs officers >>> would continue to do any inspection of cargo containers and the Coast >>> Guard would remain "in charge" of port security. But, again, very few >>> cargo inspections are conducted. And the Coast Guard merely sets >>> standards that ports are to follow and reviews their security plans. >>> Meeting those standards each day is the job of the port operators: they >>> are responsible for hiring security officers, guarding the cargo and >>> overseeing its unloading.>>>
I love the way NY Times tries to spin this. Such BS. Shows how screwed up >> NY Times is!!>>
Duh. The piece was not written by the NY Times, but by the Bush > Administration's former inspector general for Homeland Security. I suspect > the author, who is an acknowledged expect on the subject, knows just a tad > more about port security than you do, eh?>
You probably think there is no hunger in America and that everyone who > needs medical attention gets the kind of care they need.

I actually think in this case I may have been wrong about my stance on the
port thing. The more I look into it, the worse it looks. You are right, I am
wrong.


Add comment
Doug Kanter 23 February 2006 21:10:55 permanent link ]
 
"Dan J.S." <me@hyperx.com> wrote in message
news:11vru7ltnnr2ea­0@news.supernews.com­...>
<Mark_Reichert@hotm­ail.com> wrote in message > news:1140716551.887­388.266520@g14g2000c­wa.googlegroups.com.­..>> Harry Krause wrote:>>> Dan J.S. wrote:>>> Duh. The piece was not written by the NY Times, but by the Bush>>> Administration's former inspector general for Homeland Security. I>>> suspect the author, who is an acknowledged expect on the subject, knows>>> just a tad more about port security than you do, eh?>>
Don't bother Dan with facts. It makes his head hurt.>>
You probably think there is no hunger in America and that everyone who>>> needs medical attention gets the kind of care they need.>>
That would assume he cares. For most Bush sycophants, the world begins>> and ends with themselves.>>
My head is hurting, let me process these facts. Thanks!>

Can we interpret this to mean that you understand that Mr. Ervin's comments
are accurate, considering the position he held, and that your goofy comment
about the NY Times has been retracted, at least with regard to the editorial
posted earlier?


Add comment
Doug Kanter 23 February 2006 21:13:03 permanent link ]
 
"Dan J.S." <me@hyperx.com> wrote in message
news:11vrufpoqsmr3d­@news.supernews.com.­..>
"Harry Krause" <harry.krause@gmail­.com> wrote in message > news:soednQwYEMv3bG­DeRVn-uw@comcast.com­...>> Dan J.S. wrote:>>>
It is true that at the ports run by the Dubai company, Customs officers >>>> would continue to do any inspection of cargo containers and the Coast >>>> Guard would remain "in charge" of port security. But, again, very few >>>> cargo inspections are conducted. And the Coast Guard merely sets >>>> standards that ports are to follow and reviews their security plans. >>>> Meeting those standards each day is the job of the port operators: they >>>> are responsible for hiring security officers, guarding the cargo and >>>> overseeing its unloading.>>>>
I love the way NY Times tries to spin this. Such BS. Shows how screwed >>> up NY Times is!!>>>
Duh. The piece was not written by the NY Times, but by the Bush >> Administration's former inspector general for Homeland Security. I >> suspect the author, who is an acknowledged expect on the subject, knows >> just a tad more about port security than you do, eh?>>
You probably think there is no hunger in America and that everyone who >> needs medical attention gets the kind of care they need.>
I actually think in this case I may have been wrong about my stance on the > port thing. The more I look into it, the worse it looks. You are right, I > am wrong.>

At the rate you're going, you may soon be able to pass the NY State-mandated
reading comprehension test that my son took when he was 12. Congratulations!


Add comment
Dan J.S. 23 February 2006 21:23:59 permanent link ]
 
"Doug Kanter" <ancientangler@hotm­ail.com> wrote in message
news:1WmLf.976$kg.8­71@news02.roc.ny...>­
"Dan J.S." <me@hyperx.com> wrote in message > news:11vrufpoqsmr3d­@news.supernews.com.­..>>
"Harry Krause" <harry.krause@gmail­.com> wrote in message >> news:soednQwYEMv3bG­DeRVn-uw@comcast.com­...>>> Dan J.S. wrote:>>>>
It is true that at the ports run by the Dubai company, Customs >>>>> officers would continue to do any inspection of cargo containers and >>>>> the Coast Guard would remain "in charge" of port security. But, again, >>>>> very few cargo inspections are conducted. And the Coast Guard merely >>>>> sets standards that ports are to follow and reviews their security >>>>> plans. Meeting those standards each day is the job of the port >>>>> operators: they are responsible for hiring security officers, guarding >>>>> the cargo and overseeing its unloading.>>>>>
I love the way NY Times tries to spin this. Such BS. Shows how screwed >>>> up NY Times is!!>>>>
Duh. The piece was not written by the NY Times, but by the Bush >>> Administration's former inspector general for Homeland Security. I >>> suspect the author, who is an acknowledged expect on the subject, knows >>> just a tad more about port security than you do, eh?>>>
You probably think there is no hunger in America and that everyone who >>> needs medical attention gets the kind of care they need.>>
I actually think in this case I may have been wrong about my stance on >> the port thing. The more I look into it, the worse it looks. You are >> right, I am wrong.>>
At the rate you're going, you may soon be able to pass the NY > State-mandated reading comprehension test that my son took when he was 12. > Congratulations!>

You know, English was not my first language.

http://www.fana.com­/index.asp?PID=18&ci­d=48&sid=558#link558­

But it is now.


Add comment
Doug Kanter 23 February 2006 21:39:19 permanent link ]
 
"Dan J.S." <me@hyperx.com> wrote in message
news:11vrve0aav8um8­5@news.supernews.com­...>
"Doug Kanter" <ancientangler@hotm­ail.com> wrote in message > news:1WmLf.976$kg.8­71@news02.roc.ny...>­>
"Dan J.S." <me@hyperx.com> wrote in message >> news:11vrufpoqsmr3d­@news.supernews.com.­..>>>
"Harry Krause" <harry.krause@gmail­.com> wrote in message >>> news:soednQwYEMv3bG­DeRVn-uw@comcast.com­...>>>> Dan J.S. wrote:>>>>>
It is true that at the ports run by the Dubai company, Customs >>>>>> officers would continue to do any inspection of cargo containers and >>>>>> the Coast Guard would remain "in charge" of port security. But, >>>>>> again, very few cargo inspections are conducted. And the Coast Guard >>>>>> merely sets standards that ports are to follow and reviews their >>>>>> security plans. Meeting those standards each day is the job of the >>>>>> port operators: they are responsible for hiring security officers, >>>>>> guarding the cargo and overseeing its unloading.>>>>>>
I love the way NY Times tries to spin this. Such BS. Shows how screwed >>>>> up NY Times is!!>>>>>
Duh. The piece was not written by the NY Times, but by the Bush >>>> Administration's former inspector general for Homeland Security. I >>>> suspect the author, who is an acknowledged expect on the subject, knows >>>> just a tad more about port security than you do, eh?>>>>
You probably think there is no hunger in America and that everyone who >>>> needs medical attention gets the kind of care they need.>>>
I actually think in this case I may have been wrong about my stance on >>> the port thing. The more I look into it, the worse it looks. You are >>> right, I am wrong.>>>
At the rate you're going, you may soon be able to pass the NY >> State-mandated reading comprehension test that my son took when he was >> 12. Congratulations!>>
You know, English was not my first language.>
But it is now.>

Oh please. It wasn't a language issue. You saw "New York Times" and did the
usual thing - skipped the remainder of the article.


Add comment
JimH 23 February 2006 21:43:38 permanent link ]
 
"Doug Kanter" <ancientangler@hotm­ail.com> wrote in message
news:H7nLf.15621$qg­.1974@news01.roc.ny.­..>
"Dan J.S." <me@hyperx.com> wrote in message > news:11vrve0aav8um8­5@news.supernews.com­...>>
"Doug Kanter" <ancientangler@hotm­ail.com> wrote in message >> news:1WmLf.976$kg.8­71@news02.roc.ny...>­>>
"Dan J.S." <me@hyperx.com> wrote in message >>> news:11vrufpoqsmr3d­@news.supernews.com.­..>>>>
"Harry Krause" <harry.krause@gmail­.com> wrote in message >>>> news:soednQwYEMv3bG­DeRVn-uw@comcast.com­...>>>>> Dan J.S. wrote:>>>>>>
It is true that at the ports run by the Dubai company, Customs >>>>>>> officers would continue to do any inspection of cargo containers and >>>>>>> the Coast Guard would remain "in charge" of port security. But, >>>>>>> again, very few cargo inspections are conducted. And the Coast Guard >>>>>>> merely sets standards that ports are to follow and reviews their >>>>>>> security plans. Meeting those standards each day is the job of the >>>>>>> port operators: they are responsible for hiring security officers, >>>>>>> guarding the cargo and overseeing its unloading.>>>>>>>
I love the way NY Times tries to spin this. Such BS. Shows how >>>>>> screwed up NY Times is!!>>>>>>
Duh. The piece was not written by the NY Times, but by the Bush >>>>> Administration's former inspector general for Homeland Security. I >>>>> suspect the author, who is an acknowledged expect on the subject, >>>>> knows just a tad more about port security than you do, eh?>>>>>
You probably think there is no hunger in America and that everyone who >>>>> needs medical attention gets the kind of care they need.>>>>
I actually think in this case I may have been wrong about my stance on >>>> the port thing. The more I look into it, the worse it looks. You are >>>> right, I am wrong.>>>>
At the rate you're going, you may soon be able to pass the NY >>> State-mandated reading comprehension test that my son took when he was >>> 12. Congratulations!>>>­
You know, English was not my first language.>>
But it is now.>>
Oh please. It wasn't a language issue. You saw "New York Times" and did > the usual thing - skipped the remainder of the article.>

Drop it Doug. He apologized for his mistake. Move on already.


Add comment
Doug Kanter 23 February 2006 21:53:21 permanent link ]
 
" JimH" <jimh_osudad@yahooD­OT comREMOVETHIS> wrote in message
news:goudnZGdMpTCn2­PeRVn-vw@comcast.com­...>
"Doug Kanter" <ancientangler@hotm­ail.com> wrote in message > news:H7nLf.15621$qg­.1974@news01.roc.ny.­..>>
"Dan J.S." <me@hyperx.com> wrote in message >> news:11vrve0aav8um8­5@news.supernews.com­...>>>
"Doug Kanter" <ancientangler@hotm­ail.com> wrote in message >>> news:1WmLf.976$kg.8­71@news02.roc.ny...>­>>>
"Dan J.S." <me@hyperx.com> wrote in message >>>> news:11vrufpoqsmr3d­@news.supernews.com.­..>>>>>
"Harry Krause" <harry.krause@gmail­.com> wrote in message >>>>> news:soednQwYEMv3bG­DeRVn-uw@comcast.com­...>>>>>> Dan J.S. wrote:>>>>>>>
It is true that at the ports run by the Dubai company, Customs >>>>>>>> officers would continue to do any inspection of cargo containers >>>>>>>> and the Coast Guard would remain "in charge" of port security. But, >>>>>>>> again, very few cargo inspections are conducted. And the Coast >>>>>>>> Guard merely sets standards that ports are to follow and reviews >>>>>>>> their security plans. Meeting those standards each day is the job >>>>>>>> of the port operators: they are responsible for hiring security >>>>>>>> officers, guarding the cargo and overseeing its unloading.>>>>>>>>
I love the way NY Times tries to spin this. Such BS. Shows how >>>>>>> screwed up NY Times is!!>>>>>>>
Duh. The piece was not written by the NY Times, but by the Bush >>>>>> Administration's former inspector general for Homeland Security. I >>>>>> suspect the author, who is an acknowledged expect on the subject, >>>>>> knows just a tad more about port security than you do, eh?>>>>>>
You probably think there is no hunger in America and that everyone >>>>>> who needs medical attention gets the kind of care they need.>>>>>
I actually think in this case I may have been wrong about my stance on >>>>> the port thing. The more I look into it, the worse it looks. You are >>>>> right, I am wrong.>>>>>
At the rate you're going, you may soon be able to pass the NY >>>> State-mandated reading comprehension test that my son took when he was >>>> 12. Congratulations!>>>­>
You know, English was not my first language.>>>
But it is now.>>>
Oh please. It wasn't a language issue. You saw "New York Times" and did >> the usual thing - skipped the remainder of the article.>>
Drop it Doug. He apologized for his mistake. Move on already.>

OK. :-)­


Add comment
Doug Kanter 23 February 2006 21:56:14 permanent link ]
 Another thing to keep in mind is that in some countries, the line between
government and corporate entities is blurred. China's a great example, and
maybe UAE. The two halves are even cozier than here.


Add comment
Noyb 23 February 2006 22:30:48 permanent link ]
 
"Harry Krause" <harry.krause@gmail­.com> wrote in message
news:9M2dnfnnDd2aeG­DeRVn-rQ@comcast.com­...> obcboatSPLINTER@hot­mail.com wrote:>> No, eh?>>
begin quoted text >>>>>
Excerpt from 9/11 Commission testimony of CIA DIRECTOR GEORGE TENET,>> Eighth Public Hearing, Wednesday, March 24, 2004, Hart Senate Office>> Building, Washington, DC>> CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN>>
MR. FIELDING: Well, yesterday we talked about the three events in '98>> and '99 where there were occasions that it looked like there might be>> an opportunity, which then in each instance was deemed not to be>> operational. And the one that I find the most intriguing and the one>> that's been labeled as perhaps the lost opportunity more than any was>> the February '99 hunting camp, I guess it's been described, and the>> desert camp. And yesterday in the staff statement that was read, we>> were told about that and we were told that the intelligence seemed>> pretty strong, and that the preparations were made and then the strike>> was called off, and -- although the lead CIA agent in the field felt>> that it was very reliable intelligence. I guess, was there anything>> unique about the intelligence or the circumstances that necessitated>> that decision, and who made that decision?>>
MR. TENET: I don't have a recollection of the uniqueness of the>> intelligence in question at the time. I'm going to go back and provide>> that for you. In fact, I'd like to go back and try and package up all>> the data at my disposal when we were thinking about these issues.>>
I believe this was a collective decision. I also believe this target>> went away because the camp was ultimately dismantled. So in reading>> through your staff inquiry, your staff notes on this, I can't recall>> who made the call, but I know we were all in the same place about it,>> Mr. Fielding.>>
MR. FIELDING: Yeah. Well, I would appreciate that on behalf of the>> Commission if you could do that because it seemed that this -- when the>> intelligence was so good, and that by the time the camp was dismantled>> days and days had passed.>>
So I would appreciate -->>
MR. TENET: There's also a question, I believe, as to whether bin Ladin>> was inside or outside the camp -->>
MR. FIELDING: Of course.>>
MR. TENET: -- it was a complicating issue in this whole thing -- and>> whether he was there or not. So there's a second complicating factor>> here.>>
The third complicating factor here is, you might have wiped out half>> the royal family in the UAE in the process, which I'm sure entered into>> everybody's calculation in all this.>>
But in any event, I would like -- I will try and reconstruct the data>> as best I can, in terms of what I had in my possession at the time.>>
MR. FIELDING: I would appreciate it. Thank you. And thank you for your>> testimony.>>
I see that little red light is on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.>>
Excerpt from 9/11 Commission Staff Statement #6, Eighth Public Hearing,>> Tuesday, March 23, 2004, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC>> CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN:>>
The Desert Camp, February 1999. During the winter of 1998-99,>> intelligence reported that Bin Ladin frequently visited a camp in the>> desert, adjacent to a larger hunting camp in Helmand Province of>> Afghanistan, used by visitors from a Gulf state. Public sources have>> stated that these visitors were from the United Arab Emirates. At the>> beginning of February, Bin Ladin was reportedly located there, and>> apparently remained for more than a week. This was not in an urban>> area, so the risk of collateral damage was minimal. Intelligence>> provided a detailed description of the camps. National technical>> intelligence confirmed the description of the larger camp, and showed>> the nearby presence of an official aircraft of the UAE. The CIA>> received reports that Bin Ladin regularly went from his adjacent camp>> to the larger camp where he visited with Emiratis. The location of this>> larger camp was confirmed by February 9, but the location of Bin>> Ladin's quarters could not be pinned down so precisely.>>
Preparations were made for a possible strike, against the larger camp,>> perhaps to target Bin Ladin during one of his visits. No strike was>> launched.>>
According to CIA officials, policymakers were concerned about the>> danger that a strike might kill an Emirati prince or other senior>> officials who might be with Bin Ladin or close by. The lead CIA>> official in the field felt the intelligence reporting in this case was>> very reliable. The UBL unit chief at the time agrees. The field>> official believes today that this was a lost opportunity to kill Bin>> Ladin before 9/11.>>
Clarke told us the strike was called off because the intelligence was>> dubious, and it seemed to him as if the CIA was presenting an option to>> attack America's best counterterrorism ally in the Gulf. Documentary>> evidence at the time shows that on February 10th Clarke detailed to>> Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick the intelligence>> placing UBL in the camp, informed him that DOD might be in a position>> to fire the next morning, and added that General Shelton was looking at>> other options that might be ready the following week. Clarke had just>> returned from a visit to the UAE, working on counterterrorism>> cooperation and following up on a May 1998 UAE agreement to buy F-16>> aircraft from the United States.>>
On February 10th, Clarke reported that a top UAE official had>> vehemently denied that high-level UAE officials were in Afghanistan.>> Evidence subsequently confirmed that high-level UAE officials had been>> there.>>
By February 12th, Bin Ladin had apparently moved on and the immediate>> strike plans became moot.>>
In March, the entire camp complex was hurriedly disassembled. We are>> still examining several aspects of this episode.>>
Even more directly, someone here the other day was claiming that > operational authority over the ports had nothing to do with their > security.>
Well, that is wrong.>
The US Coast Guard is responsible for approving the procedures for port > security, but the operator hires the personnel to do the job and manages > them on the job.

And what about US Customs and the Port Authority?


About the Port Authority


"The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey manages and maintains the
bridges, tunnels, bus terminals, airports, PATH and seaport that are
critical to the bistate region's trade and transportation capabilities.
Through our facilities and services, people are able to make vital
connections and businesses are able to grow. Providing safe and efficient
travel is our highest priority, and enhancing the well being of everyone who
lives, works and travels here is our strongest commitment."


Maybe they didn't get your memo, eh Harry?




Add comment
Doug Kanter 23 February 2006 23:10:16 permanent link ]
 "NOYB" <noyb@noyb.com> wrote in message
news:V4oLf.2293$F56­.684@newsread3.news.­atl.earthlink.net...­> And who issues the directives as to which cargo is searched? Hmmm?

I don't know. Do you?


Add comment
JohnH 23 February 2006 23:19:11 permanent link ]
 On Thu, 23 Feb 2006 11:38:35 -0500, Harry Krause <harry.krause@gmail­.com>
wrote:
obcboatSPLINTER@ho­tmail.com wrote:>> No, eh?>>
begin quoted text >>>>>
Excerpt from 9/11 Commission testimony of CIA DIRECTOR GEORGE TENET,>> Eighth Public Hearing, Wednesday, March 24, 2004, Hart Senate Office>> Building, Washington, DC>> CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN>>
MR. FIELDING: Well, yesterday we talked about the three events in '98>> and '99 where there were occasions that it looked like there might be>> an opportunity, which then in each instance was deemed not to be>> operational. And the one that I find the most intriguing and the one>> that's been labeled as perhaps the lost opportunity more than any was>> the February '99 hunting camp, I guess it's been described, and the>> desert camp. And yesterday in the staff statement that was read, we>> were told about that and we were told that the intelligence seemed>> pretty strong, and that the preparations were made and then the strike>> was called off, and -- although the lead CIA agent in the field felt>> that it was very reliable intelligence. I guess, was there anything>> unique about the intelligence or the circumstances that necessitated>> that decision, and who made that decision?>>
MR. TENET: I don't have a recollection of the uniqueness of the>> intelligence in question at the time. I'm going to go back and provide>> that for you. In fact, I'd like to go back and try and package up all>> the data at my disposal when we were thinking about these issues.>>
I believe this was a collective decision. I also believe this target>> went away because the camp was ultimately dismantled. So in reading>> through your staff inquiry, your staff notes on this, I can't recall>> who made the call, but I know we were all in the same place about it,>> Mr. Fielding.>>
MR. FIELDING: Yeah. Well, I would appreciate that on behalf of the>> Commission if you could do that because it seemed that this -- when the>> intelligence was so good, and that by the time the camp was dismantled>> days and days had passed.>>
So I would appreciate -->>
MR. TENET: There's also a question, I believe, as to whether bin Ladin>> was inside or outside the camp -->>
MR. FIELDING: Of course.>>
MR. TENET: -- it was a complicating issue in this whole thing -- and>> whether he was there or not. So there's a second complicating factor>> here.>>
The third complicating factor here is, you might have wiped out half>> the royal family in the UAE in the process, which I'm sure entered into>> everybody's calculation in all this.>>
But in any event, I would like -- I will try and reconstruct the data>> as best I can, in terms of what I had in my possession at the time.>>
MR. FIELDING: I would appreciate it. Thank you. And thank you for your>> testimony.>>
I see that little red light is on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.>>
Excerpt from 9/11 Commission Staff Statement #6, Eighth Public Hearing,>> Tuesday, March 23, 2004, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC>> CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN:>>
The Desert Camp, February 1999. During the winter of 1998-99,>> intelligence reported that Bin Ladin frequently visited a camp in the>> desert, adjacent to a larger hunting camp in Helmand Province of>> Afghanistan, used by visitors from a Gulf state. Public sources have>> stated that these visitors were from the United Arab Emirates. At the>> beginning of February, Bin Ladin was reportedly located there, and>> apparently remained for more than a week. This was not in an urban>> area, so the risk of collateral damage was minimal. Intelligence>> provided a detailed description of the camps. National technical>> intelligence confirmed the description of the larger camp, and showed>> the nearby presence of an official aircraft of the UAE. The CIA>> received reports that Bin Ladin regularly went from his adjacent camp>> to the larger camp where he visited with Emiratis. The location of this>> larger camp was confirmed by February 9, but the location of Bin>> Ladin's quarters could not be pinned down so precisely.>>
Preparations were made for a possible strike, against the larger camp,>> perhaps to target Bin Ladin during one of his visits. No strike was>> launched.>>
According to CIA officials, policymakers were concerned about the>> danger that a strike might kill an Emirati prince or other senior>> officials who might be with Bin Ladin or close by. The lead CIA>> official in the field felt the intelligence reporting in this case was>> very reliable. The UBL unit chief at the time agrees. The field>> official believes today that this was a lost opportunity to kill Bin>> Ladin before 9/11.>>
Clarke told us the strike was called off because the intelligence was>> dubious, and it seemed to him as if the CIA was presenting an option to>> attack America's best counterterrorism ally in the Gulf. Documentary>> evidence at the time shows that on February 10th Clarke detailed to>> Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick the intelligence>> placing UBL in the camp, informed him that DOD might be in a position>> to fire the next morning, and added that General Shelton was looking at>> other options that might be ready the following week. Clarke had just>> returned from a visit to the UAE, working on counterterrorism>> cooperation and following up on a May 1998 UAE agreement to buy F-16>> aircraft from the United States.>>
On February 10th, Clarke reported that a top UAE official had>> vehemently denied that high-level UAE officials were in Afghanistan.>> Evidence subsequently confirmed that high-level UAE officials had been>> there.>>
By February 12th, Bin Ladin had apparently moved on and the immediate>> strike plans became moot.>>
In March, the entire camp complex was hurriedly disassembled. We are>> still examining several aspects of this episode.>>
Even more directly, someone here the other day was claiming that >operational authority over the ports had nothing to do with their security.>
Well, that is wrong.>
The US Coast Guard is responsible for approving the procedures for port >security, but the operator hires the personnel to do the job and manages >them on the job.

Maybe you could dredge up that post, Harry.
--
'Til next time,

John H

*******************­********************­***
***** Have a Spectacular Day! *****
*******************­********************­***
Add comment
JohnH 23 February 2006 23:28:36 permanent link ]
 On Thu, 23 Feb 2006 18:10:55 GMT, "Doug Kanter" <ancientangler@hotm­ail.com>
wrote:
"Dan J.S." <me@hyperx.com> wrote in message >news:11vru7ltnnr2e­a0@news.supernews.co­m...>>
<Mark_Reichert@hotm­ail.com> wrote in message >> news:1140716551.887­388.266520@g14g2000c­wa.googlegroups.com.­..>>> Harry Krause wrote:>>>> Dan J.S. wrote:>>>> Duh. The piece was not written by the NY Times, but by the Bush>>>> Administration's former inspector general for Homeland Security. I>>>> suspect the author, who is an acknowledged expect on the subject, knows>>>> just a tad more about port security than you do, eh?>>>
Don't bother Dan with facts. It makes his head hurt.>>>
You probably think there is no hunger in America and that everyone who>>>> needs medical attention gets the kind of care they need.>>>
That would assume he cares. For most Bush sycophants, the world begins>>> and ends with themselves.>>>
My head is hurting, let me process these facts. Thanks!>>
Can we interpret this to mean that you understand that Mr. Ervin's comments >are accurate, considering the position he held, and that your goofy comment >about the NY Times has been retracted, at least with regard to the editorial >posted earlier? >

There is nothing in Ervin's comments to indicate that port security and
port operations are mutually dependant. Nor does he indicate that port
security would be hampered by a different port operator.

If a nuke is shipped in a container, it will either get caught by port
security or it won't, regardless of who is unloading the container. Customs
chooses which containers to inspect, and how closely to inspect them.
--
'Til next time,

John H

*******************­********************­***
***** Have a Spectacular Day! *****
*******************­********************­***
Add comment
Harry Krause 23 February 2006 23:29:05 permanent link ]
 Dan J.S. wrote:> "Doug Kanter" <ancientangler@hotm­ail.com> wrote in message > news:1WmLf.976$kg.8­71@news02.roc.ny...>­> "Dan J.S." <me@hyperx.com> wrote in message >> news:11vrufpoqsmr3d­@news.supernews.com.­..>>> "Harry Krause" <harry.krause@gmail­.com> wrote in message >>> news:soednQwYEMv3bG­DeRVn-uw@comcast.com­...>>>> Dan J.S. wrote:>>>>>> It is true that at the ports run by the Dubai company, Customs >>>>>> officers would continue to do any inspection of cargo containers and >>>>>> the Coast Guard would remain "in charge" of port security. But, again, >>>>>> very few cargo inspections are conducted. And the Coast Guard merely >>>>>> sets standards that ports are to follow and reviews their security >>>>>> plans. Meeting those standards each day is the job of the port >>>>>> operators: they are responsible for hiring security officers, guarding >>>>>> the cargo and overseeing its unloading.>>>>>>
I love the way NY Times tries to spin this. Such BS. Shows how screwed >>>>> up NY Times is!!>>>>>
Duh. The piece was not written by the NY Times, but by the Bush >>>> Administration's former inspector general for Homeland Security. I >>>> suspect the author, who is an acknowledged expect on the subject, knows >>>> just a tad more about port security than you do, eh?>>>>
You probably think there is no hunger in America and that everyone who >>>> needs medical attention gets the kind of care they need.>>> I actually think in this case I may have been wrong about my stance on >>> the port thing. The more I look into it, the worse it looks. You are >>> right, I am wrong.>>>
At the rate you're going, you may soon be able to pass the NY >> State-mandated reading comprehension test that my son took when he was 12. >> Congratulations!>>
You know, English was not my first language.>
But it is now. >


Wow...Polish?
Add comment
JimH 23 February 2006 23:29:45 permanent link ]
 
"JohnH" <jherring1@yahoo.co­m> wrote in message
news:a56sv1l18r4fth­eor0kd07dn0epsh800t7­@4ax.com...> On Thu, 23 Feb 2006 11:38:35 -0500, Harry Krause <harry.krause@gmail­.com>> wrote:>
obcboatSPLINTER@h­otmail.com wrote:>>> No, eh?>>>
begin quoted text >>>>>>
Excerpt from 9/11 Commission testimony of CIA DIRECTOR GEORGE TENET,>>> Eighth Public Hearing, Wednesday, March 24, 2004, Hart Senate Office>>> Building, Washington, DC>>> CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN>>>
MR. FIELDING: Well, yesterday we talked about the three events in '98>>> and '99 where there were occasions that it looked like there might be>>> an opportunity, which then in each instance was deemed not to be>>> operational. And the one that I find the most intriguing and the one>>> that's been labeled as perhaps the lost opportunity more than any was>>> the February '99 hunting camp, I guess it's been described, and the>>> desert camp. And yesterday in the staff statement that was read, we>>> were told about that and we were told that the intelligence seemed>>> pretty strong, and that the preparations were made and then the strike>>> was called off, and -- although the lead CIA agent in the field felt>>> that it was very reliable intelligence. I guess, was there anything>>> unique about the intelligence or the circumstances that necessitated>>> that decision, and who made that decision?>>>
MR. TENET: I don't have a recollection of the uniqueness of the>>> intelligence in question at the time. I'm going to go back and provide>>> that for you. In fact, I'd like to go back and try and package up all>>> the data at my disposal when we were thinking about these issues.>>>
I believe this was a collective decision. I also believe this target>>> went away because the camp was ultimately dismantled. So in reading>>> through your staff inquiry, your staff notes on this, I can't recall>>> who made the call, but I know we were all in the same place about it,>>> Mr. Fielding.>>>
MR. FIELDING: Yeah. Well, I would appreciate that on behalf of the>>> Commission if you could do that because it seemed that this -- when the>>> intelligence was so good, and that by the time the camp was dismantled>>> days and days had passed.>>>
So I would appreciate -->>>
MR. TENET: There's also a question, I believe, as to whether bin Ladin>>> was inside or outside the camp -->>>
MR. FIELDING: Of course.>>>
MR. TENET: -- it was a complicating issue in this whole thing -- and>>> whether he was there or not. So there's a second complicating factor>>> here.>>>
The third complicating factor here is, you might have wiped out half>>> the royal family in the UAE in the process, which I'm sure entered into>>> everybody's calculation in all this.>>>
But in any event, I would like -- I will try and reconstruct the data>>> as best I can, in terms of what I had in my possession at the time.>>>
MR. FIELDING: I would appreciate it. Thank you. And thank you for your>>> testimony.>>>
I see that little red light is on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.>>>
Excerpt from 9/11 Commission Staff Statement #6, Eighth Public Hearing,>>> Tuesday, March 23, 2004, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC>>> CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN:>>>
The Desert Camp, February 1999. During the winter of 1998-99,>>> intelligence reported that Bin Ladin frequently visited a camp in the>>> desert, adjacent to a larger hunting camp in Helmand Province of>>> Afghanistan, used by visitors from a Gulf state. Public sources have>>> stated that these visitors were from the United Arab Emirates. At the>>> beginning of February, Bin Ladin was reportedly located there, and>>> apparently remained for more than a week. This was not in an urban>>> area, so the risk of collateral damage was minimal. Intelligence>>> provided a detailed description of the camps. National technical>>> intelligence confirmed the description of the larger camp, and showed>>> the nearby presence of an official aircraft of the UAE. The CIA>>> received reports that Bin Ladin regularly went from his adjacent camp>>> to the larger camp where he visited with Emiratis. The location of this>>> larger camp was confirmed by February 9, but the location of Bin>>> Ladin's quarters could not be pinned down so precisely.>>>
Preparations were made for a possible strike, against the larger camp,>>> perhaps to target Bin Ladin during one of his visits. No strike was>>> launched.>>>
According to CIA officials, policymakers were concerned about the>>> danger that a strike might kill an Emirati prince or other senior>>> officials who might be with Bin Ladin or close by. The lead CIA>>> official in the field felt the intelligence reporting in this case was>>> very reliable. The UBL unit chief at the time agrees. The field>>> official believes today that this was a lost opportunity to kill Bin>>> Ladin before 9/11.>>>
Clarke told us the strike was called off because the intelligence was>>> dubious, and it seemed to him as if the CIA was presenting an option to>>> attack America's best counterterrorism ally in the Gulf. Documentary>>> evidence at the time shows that on February 10th Clarke detailed to>>> Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick the intelligence>>> placing UBL in the camp, informed him that DOD might be in a position>>> to fire the next morning, and added that General Shelton was looking at>>> other options that might be ready the following week. Clarke had just>>> returned from a visit to the UAE, working on counterterrorism>>>­ cooperation and following up on a May 1998 UAE agreement to buy F-16>>> aircraft from the United States.>>>
On February 10th, Clarke reported that a top UAE official had>>> vehemently denied that high-level UAE officials were in Afghanistan.>>> Evidence subsequently confirmed that high-level UAE officials had been>>> there.>>>
By February 12th, Bin Ladin had apparently moved on and the immediate>>> strike plans became moot.>>>
In March, the entire camp complex was hurriedly disassembled. We are>>> still examining several aspects of this episode.>>>
Even more directly, someone here the other day was claiming that>>operational authority over the ports had nothing to do with their >>security.>>
Well, that is wrong.>>
The US Coast Guard is responsible for approving the procedures for port>>security, but the operator hires the personnel to do the job and manages>>them on the job.>
Maybe you could dredge up that post, Harry.> --> 'Til next time,>
John H>
*******************­********************­***> ***** Have a Spectacular Day! *****> *******************­********************­***

It was me making the claim. Look in the "That who controls the port thing"
thread, 2nd post.


Add comment
Harry Krause 23 February 2006 23:34:39 permanent link ]
 JohnH wrote:> On Thu, 23 Feb 2006 18:10:55 GMT, "Doug Kanter" <ancientangler@hotm­ail.com>> wrote:>
"Dan J.S." <me@hyperx.com> wrote in message >> news:11vru7ltnnr2ea­0@news.supernews.com­...>>> <Mark_Reichert@hotm­ail.com> wrote in message >>> news:1140716551.887­388.266520@g14g2000c­wa.googlegroups.com.­..>>>> Harry Krause wrote:>>>>> Dan J.S. wrote:>>>>> Duh. The piece was not written by the NY Times, but by the Bush>>>>> Administration's former inspector general for Homeland Security. I>>>>> suspect the author, who is an acknowledged expect on the subject, knows>>>>> just a tad more about port security than you do, eh?>>>> Don't bother Dan with facts. It makes his head hurt.>>>>
You probably think there is no hunger in America and that everyone who>>>>> needs medical attention gets the kind of care they need.>>>> That would assume he cares. For most Bush sycophants, the world begins>>>> and ends with themselves.>>>>
My head is hurting, let me process these facts. Thanks!>>>
Can we interpret this to mean that you understand that Mr. Ervin's comments >> are accurate, considering the position he held, and that your goofy comment >> about the NY Times has been retracted, at least with regard to the editorial >> posted earlier? >>
There is nothing in Ervin's comments to indicate that port security and> port operations are mutually dependant. Nor does he indicate that port> security would be hampered by a different port operator.>
If a nuke is shipped in a container, it will either get caught by port> security or it won't, regardless of who is unloading the container. Customs> chooses which containers to inspect, and how closely to inspect them.> --> 'Til next time,>
John H>
*******************­********************­***> ***** Have a Spectacular Day! *****> *******************­********************­***


Don't you get weary trying to rationalize Bush's utter incompetence?
Add comment
Doug Kanter 23 February 2006 23:38:30 permanent link ]
 "JohnH" <jherring1@yahoo.co­m> wrote in message
news:ui6sv1p7q3l5tq­7f14f05bcvoe2eon91tm­@4ax.com...
There is nothing in Ervin's comments to indicate that port security and> port operations are mutually dependant. Nor does he indicate that port> security would be hampered by a different port operator.

"Meeting those standards each day is the job of the port operators: they are
responsible for hiring security officers, guarding the cargo and overseeing
its unloading."

Now, which of your words should we focus on?

"would be hampered" - you're right. How about "could be hampered", since
they are responsible for hiring, guarding and overseeing its unloading?

"mutually dependent" - that's like saying if a restaurant employee puts the
meat in a different refrigerator than usual, it won't affect the chef when
the place is busy and he goes looking for meat.


Add comment
JohnH 23 February 2006 23:39:57 permanent link ]
 On Thu, 23 Feb 2006 20:27:15 GMT, "Doug Kanter" <ancientangler@hotm­ail.com>
wrote:
"JohnH" <jherring1@yahoo.co­m> wrote in message >news:a56sv1l18r4ft­heor0kd07dn0epsh800t­7@4ax.com...>
The US Coast Guard is responsible for approving the procedures for port>>>security, but the operator hires the personnel to do the job and manages>>>them on the job.>>
Maybe you could dredge up that post, Harry.>> -->> 'Til next time,>>
John H>
John, are you referring to the facts about who (operator, customs or CG) can >have an effect on security? If so, this was posted earlier, by Harry. Maybe >you missed it. As Harry suggested, pay particular attention to the >qualifications of the author, and to the 5th paragraph of his article.

Harry stated:

"Even more directly, someone here the other day was claiming that
operational authority over the ports had nothing to do with their
security."

I asked if he could dredge up that post. I referred to nothing more.
--
'Til next time,

John H

*******************­********************­***
***** Have a Spectacular Day! *****
*******************­********************­***
Add comment